Supreme Court: Quasi-Judicial Bodies Cannot Condoned Delay Without Statutory Power

The Supreme Court has recently clarified that the Limitation Act, 1963 does not automatically extend to tribunals or quasi-judicial authorities. Its applicability arises only when the statute establishing such bodies expressly grants them the power to condone delays.

In its January 7 ruling in The Property Company v. Rohinton Daddy Mazda, a Bench comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan allowed an appeal by The Property Company (P) Ltd., holding that the Company Law Board (CLB), being a tribunal, had no inherent authority to excuse a delayed appeal under Section 58(3) of the Companies Act, 2013.

The Court explained that the provisions of the Limitation Act—including the prescribed time limits and Sections 4 to 24—are meant for proceedings before “courts.” They do not automatically apply to tribunals or other quasi-judicial bodies unless the relevant law specifically empowers them to do so.

The dispute related to 20 equity shares in The Property Company (P) Ltd. originally owned by Mehroo Mazda and later willed to her son, Rohinton Daddy Mazda, in 1987. Although probate of the will was obtained in 1990, he only sought transfer of the shares in 2013. The company refused the request on April 30, 2013, and his subsequent appeal under Section 58(3) was filed 249 days late. While the CLB and the High Court condoned this delay, the Supreme Court has now ruled that such condonation was beyond their jurisdiction.

The Court made three key points:

1. Tribunals are distinct from courts – They do not enjoy the discretionary powers under the Limitation Act unless expressly granted by Parliament.
2. Time limits in statutes are binding – Even if rigid language like “but not thereafter” is absent, statutory timelines must still be strictly followed.
3. Later laws cannot revive expired remedies – The power given to the NCLT under Section 433 of the Companies Act, 2013 to apply the Limitation Act cannot operate retrospectively to save already time-barred claims.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the decisions of the Company Law Board and the Calcutta High Court, holding that the respondent’s appeal was barred by limitation and had to be dismissed.